Lucho Acosta finally got the move he wanted.
The 2023 Landon Donovan MLS MVP – who was arguably even better in 2024, right up until he picked up a pair of mid-season foot injuries – had made it abundantly clear, after FC Cincinnati were eliminated from the Audi MLS Cup Playoffs, that he did not want to return. Four years was, apparently, long enough. Bridges, he said, had been burned (he eventually chalked this up to a personality dispute with general manager Chris Albright). Argentina, he claimed, was calling.
There would be no happy reunion, no chance to bury the hatchet. What was done was done.
A week earlier, the Portland Timbers had gone through almost the exact same thing with their MVP-caliber No. 10, Evander. He, too, had pointed a finger at the front office, and he, too, had eyes on the door. Portland head coach Phil Neville, who’d been the Brazilian’s biggest cheerleader throughout 2024, seemed happy to show it to him.
Again, there would be no happy reunion, no mending of fences. Evander had dropped a nuclear bomb in the wake of the Timbers’ 5-0 defeat vs. the Whitecaps, and all that was left was to move on.
On Tuesday news broke that Acosta had been sold to FC Dallas (who’d been in the market for a No. 10 of their own after selling Alan Velasco to Boca Juniors) for up to $6 million in cash, as well as some incentives. Hours later, news broke that Cincy had filled their suddenly glaring need for a No. 10 by reportedly buying Evander from the Timbers for $12 million plus incentives.
And within minutes, Portland were backfilling their need by reportedly acquiring Portuguese attacker David da Costa from RC Lens for around $6 million.
Two old faces, and one new. Let’s see where that leaves these teams:
Frisco, Texas isn’t Argentina, but once Boca Juniors bought Velasco and River Plate bought Sebastián Driussi, the list of Argentine teams that could afford Lucho’s wages dropped to effectively zero. Racing and Estudiantes maybe could, but neither need a 10.
Dallas did, and they had the profit of the Velasco sale burning a hole in their pocket. It makes sense just in terms of filling a need, even as Lucho hits his 30s.
On the field, it should be a smooth fit. Dallas have a lot of energetic, pacy wingers who attack space; Lucho is one of the league’s foremost through-ball artists. They have a pure goal-scoring No. 9 in Petar Musa who thrives on service; Lucho is one of the best playmakers ever to lace up his boots in this league.
And what’s arguably most important is that new head coach Eric Quill has tended to prefer a vanilla 4-2-3-1 thus far as a manager. That’s not a knock on Quill – I still think the 4-2-3-1 is the most resilient and flexible formation in the game, since it can easily flex into mid-block or deep-lying banks of four without the ball; and since it can easily create wide overloads if fullbacks are released on the overlap (or, more often these days, on the underlap); and since, most importantly, it is built to accommodate a No. 10 who likes to roam.
Think about the great Nico Lodeiro-era Sounders teams, which are perhaps the best example of a successful 4-2-3-1 in this league’s history. Lodeiro would go everywhere looking to get on the ball, and the Sounders were well-drilled in understanding that and adjusting their shape and off-ball movement to his roaming. When you have the personnel to do it (I think Dallas largely do) and everyone buys in, it works.
That’s what needs to happen with Lucho. Even at his best in Cincinnati, there was a tension between the No. 10 he was (he roams to get on the ball almost as much as Lodeiro, though with what I’ll call a more sporadic defensive commitment) and the No. 10 Albright and head coach Pat Noonan wanted him to be.
At his best, it didn’t matter. At his worst, it created a massive dislocation between himself and the front line, and if you look back at some of goals Cincy gave up in the second half of 2024, you’ll often find Lucho 60 yards from goal, flared out to the left touchline with no support, trying to dribble two opposing defenders.
Dallas should be drilled to prevent that. If they are, the defense will be good. If Lucho and Musa are healthy, the attack will be good. And if you’re good on both sides of the ball, points tend to follow.
In Evander, the Garys get a version of Lucho who’s four years younger, isn’t coming off a season marred by injury, and does just about everything Lucho does in the final third. And he does some stuff (defense – when he’s locked in, anyway – and thunderbastards from distance) a level or three better.
The real difference between them, though, is Evander is a creature of the final third who is mostly content to stay there. You can see that in their FBRef chart:
One way of reading that is Lucho gives you more: He receives more progressive passes, gives more progressive carries, and certainly loves to take on any and everyone 1v1. But the subtext of that data is Lucho gives you more because he’s roaming – he’s breaking Cincy’s structure to hunt the ball.
On the other hand, Evander was more disciplined in finding pockets of space and letting the play come to him. Given how good Pavel Bucha is at hitting those kinds of passes, and how good Obinna Nwobodo was at basic ball progression in 2023 (his numbers cratered in 2024 as he had to be purely a destroyer), that’s a No. 10 whose skillset fits with the other players Cincy have already invested in. And he’s on the same timeline (he’s 26) as all of them.
I think Cincy had the best transfer window in the league. They are set up to win big this year, as well as for the next three.
The Timbers bought Evander for reportedly $10 million ahead of the 2023 season, got six months of settling in followed by 18 months of MVP-caliber ball, and sold him at a profit. That’s a good bit of business.
Will they do as well with da Costa, Evander’s replacement? It seems unlikely, but I don’t think that matters to Portland. I think what matters to Portland is turning da Costa into the next Diego Valeri or even Sebastián Blanco – a guy who sticks around for years and becomes a symbol of who the team is. They would rather have that than an extra $2 million from spinning the transfer wheel.
As for how da Costa will fit on the field, it seems extremely likely that he will play as a pure No. 10, just as Evander did. And while he brings a No. 10’s eye for the final ball, he hasn’t gotten into the box and finished off plays himself the way Evander did (or Acosta has for a decade, for that matter).
It might be something he grows into in MLS, as he’s just turned 24 and it’s not unthinkable that he’ll add box arrival to his game.
More to the point, though, is he’s been a No. 10 who added a lot of defensive value throughout his time in Ligue 1. For a Timbers side that conceded 56 goals in the regular season last year (and then five more in 90 all-time bad postseason minutes), that matters a ton. It’s especially relevant because Portland, while probably not as bad defensively as those numbers suggest, were extremely bad when forced to scramble. And if you have a No. 10 who doubles as a point-of-attack defender who makes it hard for opposing defenders to hit line-breaking passes, then you’ll scramble much less often.
It won’t make highlight reels, but the theory here is good.
In the wake of these moves, my buddy Tutul made what I think was a good point on the efficacy of this rule:
The 4.0 argument in his words: “A mechanism that keeps productive DPs in the league would have net positive effects of league quality.
“Like the Lucho-Evander switch in the past would've resulted in both getting sold internationally and three teams (including FCD) buying new DP 10s. If they hit at 50%, then the league is losing two really good ones and expecting to gain 1.5, and is almost guaranteed to be negative in transfer spend.
“Instead, MLS holds on to Lucho and Evander, who should have a much higher chance to continue to be excellent. Portland have a new DP at 50% rate, and we have a net positive for the league.”
It’s a compelling argument!
Between these moves and the sale of Dejan Joveljić to Sporting KC, as well as Houston paying for Jack McGlynn and Colorado paying for Ted Ku-DiPietro – homegrowns who had no pathway to more meaningful roles with their home club – the early returns have been pretty great. We’re seeing more of the best players stay in the league, and we’re seeing more talented young players find spots where they’re likely to hit their potential.
